HERITAGE FOUNDATION – NEW START TREATY COULD PROFOUNDLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Twelve Flaws of New START
That Will Be Difficult to Fix
Baker Spring
September 16, 2010
Abstract: President Barack Obama has transmitted a
deeply flawed arms control treaty to the Senate for its consent
to ratification. While withholding consent is the simplest
and most likely approach, the Senate may try to fix
the treaty piecemeal, but this approach has inherent, serious
risks. Fixing some of the serious flaws will require amendments
to the text, and fixing others will require compelling
the Administration to change some of its policies. Regardless
of what the Senate chooses, the stakes are high. As with
all major arms control treaties, if New START enters into
force, it could profoundly increase the likelihood of nuclear
war and increase the number of weapons in the world.
New START is a deeply flawed arms control treaty
with Russia. It is the product of a contradictory and
wrong-headed approach to strategic nuclear arms
control by the Obama Administration. The Administration’s
approach to strategic nuclear arms control
combines the worst aspects of Cold War arms control,
which resulted in a nuclear arms race between the
United States and the Soviet Union, with the worst
aspects of President Barack Obama’s stated policy of
seeking a world without nuclear weapons, which carries
the serious risk of generating a nuclear conflict.
Because the President transmitted New START to
the Senate for its advice and consent on May 13,
2010, the question arises as to whether the Senate can
fix the flaws in or associated with the treaty. The
procedural and legal answer to this question is an
unequivocal yes.
No. 2466
September 16, 2010
Talking Points
This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
report.heritage.org/bg2466
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Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting
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aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
• The New START strategic nuclear arms control
agreement with Russia has at least 12 significant
flaws.
• Under the Constitution’s advice and consent
clause on treaty making, the Senate has the
power to fix these flaws, but the task will not
be easy.
• The Senate can choose to rewrite the treaty
by amending its text in select places and by
amending the resolution of ratification to
include reservations, understandings, declarations,
and conditions.
• These options are not mutually exclusive.
The Senate needs to recognize that, while
one particular fix for a problem may yield a
more confident outcome, that fix may prove
more difficult to pass on the Senate floor. Correspondingly,
a fix that is more likely to garner
majority support in the Senate may prove
less reliable and effective.
No. 2466
page 2
September 16, 2010
The Constitution grants the Senate broad power
in giving its advice and consent in the making of
treaties.1 In giving its advice, the Senate can alter
the text of any treaty brought before it.2 Therefore,
the Senate could rewrite New START to fix the flaws
and change it into a treaty that serves U.S. interests.
However, as a practical matter, rewriting New
START essentially from scratch on the Senate floor
would be difficult. The simpler and more likely
approach would be for the Senate to withhold its
consent to ratification and encourage the President
to renegotiate the treaty.
A third approach is for the Senate to identify the
specific flaws in or associated with New START and
to fix those flaws with a series of amendments to
the treaty itself or to the resolution of ratification.3
This piecemeal approach can work, but it will be
difficult and could lead to uncertain outcomes
because some remedies to the identified flaws, particularly
those that are amendments to the resolution
of ratification, may only partially repair the
specific flaws they address. Thus, this approach has
inherent, serious risks. On the final vote, it will
likely require the Senate to make a difficult judgment
call on whether the amendments to the treaty
and the resolution of ratification have sufficiently
fixed the treaty’s critical flaws.
To demonstrate the difficulties and uncertainties
in this approach, this paper identifies the 12 important
flaws in or associated with New START and
suggests a range of remedies that the Senate could
apply to correct each flaw.
The 12 Flaws and Their Remedies
New START has at least 12 specific flaws that
could seriously harm the security of the U.S. and its
allies. Some are internal to the treaty itself. Others
are external to the text of the treaty, but would still
create or exacerbate security problems. The Senate
has every reason to seek remedies to these 12 flaws.
For some flaws, more than one remedy is suggested,
and the multiple remedies may not be mutually
exclusive.
Flaw #1: New START fails to speak to the issue
of protecting and defending the U.S. and its
allies against strategic attack.
Given the trends in the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and the means to deliver them, the most
important step that the U.S. needs to take is to move
away from the Cold War deterrence policy. That policy
bases deterrence on the U.S. threatening to retaliate
for a strategic attack on the U.S. or its allies with
a devastating nuclear counterstrike. The U.S. needs
to move toward a deterrence policy based on protecting
and defending the people, territory, institutions,
and infrastructure of the U.S. and its allies
against looming or attempted strategic attacks.4 New
START does nothing to facilitate this transition.
The Senate can best remedy the flaw that New
START does not move toward a defense-oriented
deterrence policy by attaching a declaration to the
resolution of ratification stating that the U.S. is committed
to defending its population, territory, institutions,
and infrastructure and those of its allies
against strategic attack to the best of its ability. Second,
the declaration should point out that retalia-
1. U.S. Constitution, Art. II, Sect. 2, Cl. 2.
2. Floyd M. Riddick, Senate Procedure (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981), pp. 1049–1063, and U.S. Senate, “Treaties and Other
International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate,” S.Rpt. 106–71, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 2001, p. 11.
3. The resolution of ratification is the document, which if approved, expresses the Senate’s consent to the ratification of a
treaty. The resolution may be amended by the Senate to include reservations, understandings, declarations, and
conditions.
4. Nuclear Stability Working Group, Nuclear Games II: An Exercise Examining the Dynamic of Missile Defenses and Arms Control
in a Proliferated World, Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 83, July 26, 2010, at www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2010/07/nuclear-games-ii-an-exercise-in-examining-the-dynamic-of-missile-defenses-and-arms-control.
_________________________________________
The U.S. needs to move toward a deterrence
policy based on protecting and defending the
people, territory, institutions, and infrastructure
of the U.S. and its allies against looming or
attempted strategic attacks.
____________________________________________
page 3
No. 2466 September 16, 2010
tion-based deterrence is an increasingly tenuous
concept in a proliferated world. Third, the declaration
should announce that the U.S. intends to construct
an overall strategic posture consisting of a
mix of offensive and defensive, nuclear and conventional
forces that are optimized for holding at risk
the means of strategic attack against the U.S. and its
allies. Finally, the declaration should encourage
Russia to adopt a more defense-oriented strategic
posture and policy.
The risk with this approach is that the remedy is
merely a declaration. As only a statement of intent
by the U.S., it cannot force even the U.S. government,
much less the government of Russia, to take
substantive steps toward a more defensive strategic
posture. It represents an important, but ultimately
tentative step in the right direction.
Flaw #2: New START imposes restrictions on
U.S. missile defense options.
New START imposes restrictions on U.S. missile
defense options in at least four areas. The first and
most important restriction is derived from paragraph
9 of the preamble. This language applies a
logic that says that U.S. missile defense capabilities
must be reduced in accordance with the reduction in
the strategic offensive arms of Russia because the
defenses will otherwise “undermine the viability and
effectiveness” of Russia’s offensive force. On April 7,
2010, Russia reinforced this restriction by issuing a
unilateral statement asserting that Russia could
withdraw from New START if the U.S. takes either
qualitative or quantitative steps to build up its missile
defense capabilities. Second, Article V prohibits
conversion of offensive strategic missile launchers to
launchers of defensive interceptors and vice versa.
Third, several provisions limit and restrict certain
types of missiles and missile launchers that are used
as targets in missile defense tests.5 Finally, the treaty
gives the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC),
the treaty’s implementing body, a broad mandate
that could permit it to impose additional restrictions
on the U.S. missile defense program.6
The certain remedy for these flaws is for the Senate
to modify the text of the treaty in each instance.
The Senate could simply strike the language in the
preamble. Article V could be amended to remove
the prohibition against converting offensive missile
launchers to launchers of defensive interceptors,
while retaining the prohibition against converting
launchers of defensive interceptors to launchers of
offensive strategic missiles. The restrictions on certain
kinds of missiles used as targets in missile
defense tests and their associated launchers could
be eliminated by redefining the kinds of missiles
and launchers subject to the treaty’s restrictions to
exclude those used for missile defense tests. Finally,
the Senate could modify the relevant portions of the
treaty, including Part 6 of the protocol, to narrow
the scope of the BCC’s authority in a way that bars it
from considering any arrangements that extend to
the subject of ballistic missile defense.
A somewhat less certain remedy is for the Senate
to adopt two reservations regarding the specific provisions
in the preamble and the activities of the
BCC. The first would explicitly reserve U.S. options
for qualitatively and quantitatively improving its
missile defense capabilities in any way it chooses.
The second would reserve the U.S. right to object to
the BCC’s considering of any arrangement on missile
defense. Adopting these reservations would
require Russia to decide whether to accept the U.S.
reservations in the course of exchanging the instruments
of ratification. However, this remedy is not
appropriate for the provisions that prohibit the conversion
of launchers and restrict targets and launchers
for missile defense test. In these two cases, the
restrictions in the text are specific and clear, which
makes reservations in these instances problematic.
Another remedy is for the Senate to attach a condition
to the resolution of ratification. This condition
would describe the specific steps for improving
U.S. missile defense capabilities, including necessary
funding levels for these steps, and require President
Obama to certify his support for these steps
5. Baker Spring, “Another Limit Imposed by the New START Treaty,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2939, June 18,
2010, at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/06/Another-Limit-Imposed-by-the-New-START-Treaty.
6. New START Working Group, “An Independent Assessment of New START,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2410,
April 30, 2010, pp. 7–8, at www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/04/an-independent-assessment-of-new-start-treaty.
No. 2466
page 4
September 16, 2010
prior to exchanging the instruments of ratification.
This remedy would blunt Russian attempts to
weaken the U.S. missile defense program because
President Obama would be honor-bound to block
such attempts. The weakness with this remedy is
that a future Congress could decide to reject these
steps, perhaps because of stated Russian objections.
This condition could also include a provision that
requires the President to certify that he will conclude
any future international agreements that
would restrict U.S. missile defense options only as
treaties subject to Senate advice and consent. Such
treaties could include a “preventing an arms race in
outer space” (PAROS) agreement or a space “code of
conduct” agreement.
The weakest remedy is for the Senate to amend
the resolution of ratification with a declaration. It
would replace the Administration’s unilateral declaration
on April 7, 2010, in response to the Russian
unilateral statement, which basically states that the
U.S. will not pursue its missile defense program in a
way that would lead to Russian objections. The
alternative declaration could challenge the legitimacy
of the claim in the Russian unilateral statement
that certain undefined steps by the U.S. to
defend itself and its allies against missile attacks are
somehow “extraordinary events” that would justify
Russian withdrawal under Article XIV of the treaty.
This is a weak remedy because it only states the U.S.
position on the matter of withdrawal and does not
impose any direct obligation on Russia not to withdraw
because of improvements made in U.S. missile
defense capabilities.
Flaw #3: The atrophying U.S. nuclear arsenal and
weapons enterprise make reductions in the U.S.
strategic nuclear arsenal even more dangerous.
Article V of New START permits strategic nuclear
modernization, but the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal
has aged, and the weapons enterprise that is
necessary to pursue modernization has atrophied
over the past two decades. This includes an alarming
weakening of the industrial base for solid rocket
motors. These nuclear modernization problems are
not in the text of the treaty or its interpretation, but
exist only in relation to the treaty, which exacerbates
these problems.
The solution to the ongoing problems with the
lack of nuclear weapons modernization depends on
a commitment between the Obama Administration
and Congress to pursue nuclear modernization on a
sustained basis. During the consideration of New
START, the Senate could amend the resolution of ratification
with a condition that requires President
Obama and congressional leaders to commit to a
detailed nuclear modernization agenda that extends
for the 10-year life of New START. Specifically, this
condition would outline this agenda and require the
President to certify that he supports it and that he
has received a letter cosigned by leaders of both the
House and Senate certifying that they support it.
One problem with this remedy is that an effective
nuclear modernization program will take many
years to accomplish, and the current Congress cannot
legally bind the President and future Congresses
to enact the necessary legislation, including
authorization and appropriations bills.
There is also a logical problem. Members in
Congress concerned about the atrophying nuclear
arsenal and weapons enterprise are seeking a deal
with Obama on this issue in the context of Senate
consideration of New START for a reason. The
Obama Administration is only supporting the
modernization effort as a means to obtain Senate
consent to the ratification of New START. If the
Obama Administration supported the nuclear
modernization program on its merits, no deal
would be needed. Once the treaty is ratified, nothing
will prevent the Obama Administration from
walking away from the nuclear modernization
program. Compounding this problem is the high
likelihood that the House Energy and Water Appropriations
Subcommittee will continue to block
essential portions of an effective nuclear modernization
program as it has in the past.
_________________________________________
The U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal has aged, and
the weapons enterprise that is necessary to
pursue modernization has atrophied over the
past two decades.
____________________________________________
page 5
No. 2466 September 16, 2010
Flaw #4: New START counts conventional
“prompt global strike” weapons against the
numerical limits imposed on nuclear arms.
New START is supposed to be about limiting
strategic nuclear arms. There is no justifiable reason
for counting conventional weapons against the
numerical limits in the treaty.
The Senate’s only viable option to remedy this
flaw is to amend the treaty text. Specifically, the Senate
could modify New START so that it follows the
approach taken in the Moscow Treaty, which
imposed numerical limits on only operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads. By stripping the
numerical limits on delivery vehicles and launchers
out of the treaty, this approach would leave conventionally
armed systems unrestricted. This is a
certain remedy to this flaw, but it will require a
sweeping amendment to the text of the treaty.
Flaw #5: The Obama Administration has made
New START an essential part of a broader agenda
that pursues the goals of nuclear nonproliferation
and nuclear disarmament concurrently.
While this concurrent pursuit of nonproliferation
and nuclear disarmament is implied in several
provisions of New START’s preamble, the true
source of the problem is in the Obama Administration’s
overall approach. The approach is fundamentally
flawed because it presents a sequencing
problem with nonproliferation and disarmament.
Specifically, the Obama Administration is clearly
committed to a policy that asserts that for every negative
development in the area of nuclear proliferation
the U.S. needs to take a substantive step in the
direction of nuclear disarmament, and New START
is a product of this misguided approach. Ultimately,
this approach effectively assumes that the possession
of nuclear arms by the U.S. is the incentive
driving other nations to pursue nuclear weapons
programs. Not only is the assumption misplaced,
but the policy will undermine deterrence and
increase the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons.
7 At some point, the Obama Administration
will need to recognize that it is foolish for the U.S. to
take substantive steps toward nuclear disarmament
at the same time the nuclear proliferation problem is
growing worse.
Because this flaw is associated with New START
but not a central element of the treaty itself, the Senate
can best remedy it by adopting a declaration to
the resolution of ratification that supersedes the
Obama Administration’s policy of simultaneously
pursuing nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament.
This declaration should specifically state
that it is the policy of the U.S. to sequence the pursuit
of nuclear proliferation goals and nuclear disarmament
by first achieving universal adherence to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and realizing the
NPT’s promise of just five nuclear weapons states
(the U.S., China, France, Russia, and the United
Kingdom) before taking substantive steps toward
nuclear disarmament.
Flaw #6: New START’s limits are uninformed by
a targeting policy that is governed by the protect
and defend strategy.
Flaw #1 is that the treaty is not consistent with a
broader policy for protecting and defending the U.S.
and its allies against strategic attacks. A key derivative
of this flaw is that New START is not accompanied
by a strategic targeting policy that is based on
holding at risk the current and potential means of
strategic attack on the U.S. and its allies. While this
flaw is external to the treaty, it is still a serious shortcoming
in the policy that produced the treaty.
Accordingly, the Senate should amend the resolution
of ratification to require the President to certify
to the Senate that he will establish a targeting
policy for U.S. strategic forces that is designed to
provide the best protection possible to the population,
territory, institutions, and infrastructure of the
U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. Specifically,
the President would certify that this counterforce
targeting policy will divide U.S. strategic
7. Nuclear Stability Working Group, Nuclear Games II.
_________________________________________
It is foolish for the U.S. to take substantive steps
toward nuclear disarmament at the same time the
nuclear proliferation problem is growing worse.
____________________________________________
No. 2466
page 6
September 16, 2010
targets into three baskets: targets best held at risk by
offensive nuclear forces, targets best held at risk by
conventional strike systems, and targets best held at
risk by defensive systems with an appropriate level
of redundancy.
Flaw #7: New START leaves in place a large
Russian advantage in nonstrategic (tactical)
nuclear weapons.
While the exact numbers are not public, Russia
reportedly has a several-fold numerical advantage
over the U.S. in tactical nuclear weapons.8 New
START does not impose any limits whatsoever on
tactical nuclear weapons. As such, the Russian
advantage poses a significant challenge for the U.S.
in maintaining a credible extended deterrence policy
for the benefit of its allies.
Given the Russian advantage in tactical nuclear
weapons, the Obama Administration understandably
chose not to include this subject in the New
START negotiations. U.S. negotiators would have
no cards to play in the negotiations on tactical
nuclear weapons, and the outcome would inevitably
have been strongly in Russia’s favor.
Under current circumstances, the best option for
the U.S. is to treat Russia’s advantage in tactical
nuclear weapons as a compliance issue. The Strategic
Posture Commission found that Russia is not
honoring its commitments under the Presidential
Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of the early 1990s, which
subject these weapons to certain restrictions.9 The
commission also reaffirmed the necessity of maintaining
the U.S. policy of extended deterrence to its
allies in key regions, including Europe.10
Accordingly, the Senate should attach a condition
to the resolution of ratification that requires the
President to certify two points on this subject: First,
he will not exchange the instruments of ratification
for New START until Russia has demonstrated that
it is fulfilling its PNI commitments. Second, he will
not exchange the instruments of ratification until he
has received a letter signed by all the members of
the Strategic Posture Commission stating that they
have reviewed the Administration’s policies and plans
for sustaining the extended deterrence policies, particularly
for U.S. allies in Europe near Russia, and
found those policies and plans to be adequate.
Flaw #8: New START does not appear to limit
rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs).
The definitions of rail-mobile ICBMs and railmobile
ICBM launchers established in the expired
START, which applied to the associated restrictions
and limitations in START, are not in New START.11
At a minimum, this makes it plausible that Russia
will claim that any rail-mobile ICBMs and ICBM
launchers that it may build are not subject to New
START limitations. The Obama Administration
asserts that rail-mobile ICBMs and launchers are
captured by the treaty under generic definitions of
deployed ICBMs and deployed and non-deployed
ICBM launchers by inference.12 However, it
acknowledges that if Russia builds a rail-mobile
ICBM and its associated launcher, the BCC will
need to adjust the definitions. Yet the State Department
has not explained why these necessary adjustments
would not require amending the treaty.
8. Amy F. Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 14, 2010,
pp. 11 and 17, at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf (September 14, 2010).
9. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace, 2009), p. 13, at www.usip.org/files/America%27s_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf
(September 14, 2010).
10. Ibid., pp. 20–21.
11. New START Working Group, “An Independent Assessment of New START,” pp. 3–4.
12. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, “Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and
Their Missiles,” Fact Sheet, August 2, 2010, at www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/145557.htm (August 24, 2010).
_________________________________________
New START does not impose any limits whatsoever
on tactical nuclear weapons.
____________________________________________
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No. 2466 September 16, 2010
The certain remedy to this is for the Senate to
amend the definitions in the treaty’s protocol to
cover rail-mobile ICBMs and ICBM launchers
explicitly. The less certain remedy is for the Senate
to attach an understanding to the resolution of ratification
that makes it clear that the generic definitions
of ICBMs and ICBM launchers cover railmobile
systems.
Flaw #9: The BCC’s mandate is overly broad.
With its broad mandate, the Bilateral Consultative
Commission could undertake arrangements
that go beyond the proper scope of the treaty, such
as adopting additional restrictions on U.S. missile
defense options. Other steps that purportedly support
implementation of the treaty could actually
extend to matters requiring formal amendment to
the treaty. Finally, certain arrangements could be
inconsistent with the authoritative representations
of the meaning of the treaty that the Administration
provided to the Senate before ratification. These
kinds of unwarranted proposals in the BCC could
be initiated by either the U.S. or Russia.
To prevent the BCC from abusing its overly
broad mandate, the Senate should attach a condition
to the resolution of ratification that requires the
President to certify that the U.S. will not propose
arrangements at the BCC that go beyond the treaty’s
scope, that extend to matters that should be handled
as amendments to the treaty, or that are inconsistent
with the Administration’s representations to
the Senate. Further, the certification should state
that the U.S. will not consider any similar proposals
from Russia. Finally, the certification should commit
the President to share the final draft of any
arrangement under consideration at the BCC with
Members of the Senate and to consult with Senators
on the implications of such arrangements before
their adoption.
The weakness in this remedy is that its success
depends on Senators remaining vigilant after the
required certification. This is a 10-year treaty, and
the Russians and the U.S. executive branch will be
tempted to use the BCC’s broad authority as an
expedient for concluding the arrangements that
they want, perhaps at the expense of U.S. security
interests and the prerogatives of the Senate.
Flaw #10: The New START limitations are
unclear on whether they would permit the U.S. to
counter future threats from a combination of states.
New START’s limits were apparently based on
maintaining a balance of strategic nuclear forces
between the U.S. and Russia, but this is the wrong
way to view the balance of forces in a proliferating
world. The treaty’s bilateral approach leaves unanswered
what the U.S. will do if it faces a combination
of strategic threats from several nations,
including Russia.
The Senate can address this apparent flaw in New
START by attaching a condition to the resolution of
ratification. The condition would require the President
to certify to the Senate that during the life of this
treaty he will not permit the number of real—as
opposed to accountable—operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal to fall
below 95 percent of the combined arsenals of Russia,
China, Iran, North Korea, and any other potentially
hostile nation with strategic nuclear weapons.
However, the effectiveness of this condition will
depend on the U.S. intelligence community and the
State Department’s verification office keeping a current,
accurate, and honest assessment of the potentially
threatening strategic nuclear weapons that are
deployed around the world.
Flaw #11: New START is not adequately verifiable.13
Compared to the expired START’s verification
regime, the New START verification regime is signif-
13. New START Working Group, “New START: Potemkin Village Verification,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2428,
June 24, 2010, at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/06/New-START-Potemkin-Village-Verification, and Paula A.
DeSutter, “Verification and the New START Treaty,” Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 1160, July 12, 2010, at
www.heritage.org/research/lecture/verification-and-the-new-start-treaty.
_________________________________________
The treaty’s bilateral approach leaves unanswered
what the U.S. will do if it faces a combination
of strategic threats from several nations, including
Russia.
____________________________________________
No. 2466
page 8
September 16, 2010
icantly less robust, even though New START will
drive the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal to lower
levels. The specific areas that are significantly less
robust include:
• A narrowing of the requirements for exchanging
telemetry,
• A reduction in the effectiveness of the inspections,
• Weaknesses in the ability to verify the number of
deployed warheads on ICBMs and submarinelaunched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs),
• Abolition of the START verification regime governing
mobile ICBMs, and
• A weakening of the verification standards governing
the elimination of delivery vehicles.
The Senate can certainly shore up New START’s
verification regime by amending the text of the
treaty as necessary. However, this would require an
extensive and complicated rewriting of the verification
provisions of the treaty, including its protocol
and annexes.
The less certain remedy is for the Senate to attach
a condition to the resolution of ratification that
requires the President to certify to the Senate prior
to ratification that the U.S. and Russia are committed
to undertaking negotiations on a separate strategic
transparency treaty immediately following
ratification and that this treaty will increase transparency
in each of these areas and perhaps others.
The weakness with this remedy is that the success of
the follow-on negotiations is uncertain.
Flaw #12: The Obama Administration believes
that Russian cheating under New START is only
a marginal concern.
On July 20, 2010, Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy James N. Miller asserted
in testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee that Russian cheating or breakout under
the treaty would have little effect because of the U.S.
second-strike strategic nuclear capability.14 The
Administration’s cavalier attitude about the prospect
of Russian cheating under New START is not a
problem with the text of the treaty, but with the
Administration itself.
The Senate can begin to remedy the Obama
Administration’s propensity to dismiss the ramifications
of Russian cheating by amending the resolution
of ratification. This amendment would require
the President to certify to the Senate that at any
point during the life of the treaty when Russian
compliance with its terms is ambiguous or, worse,
when direct evidence indicates Russian cheating, he
will put the issue on the BCC’s agenda and simultaneously
provide the Senate with a proposal for a
U.S. responsive step that is proportional to the
suspected action of Russian noncompliance. The
proposed response should be matched with a consultative
process between the executive branch and
the Senate to perfect the proposed response if
implementing it becomes necessary.
The weakness with this condition in addressing
the possibility of Russian noncompliance with the
terms of New START is that it cannot prevent the
Obama Administration from studiously avoiding
finding possible instances of noncompliant behavior.
Further, its effectiveness will require constant
vigilance by the Senate over often arcane and complex
compliance issues for the entire life of the
treaty. Such vigilance by the Senate is far from certain.
Conclusion
The flaws in and associated with New START are
numerous, substantive, and serious. The Senate will
find them difficult to fix. Essentially, the Senate has
two broad choices: It can (1) defer granting its consent
to ratification or reject the treaty outright and
instruct the Obama Administration to negotiate a
14. “Hearing to Receive Testimony on Implementation of the New START,” Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 111th
Cong, 2nd Sess., July 20, 2010, p. 5, at armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2010/07%20July/10-61%20-%207-20-
10.pdf (August 25, 2010).
_________________________________________
The Administration’s cavalier attitude about the
prospect of Russian cheating under New START
is not a problem with the text of the treaty, but
with the Administration itself.
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No. 2466 September 16, 2010
new treaty or series of treaties with Russia that do
not have these flaws or (2) try to remedy the flaws
by redrafting significant portions of the treaty and
adopting a series of amendments to the resolution
of ratification. If the Senate chooses the latter
approach, it should be prepared for a long and complicated
process on the Senate floor. This approach
would necessarily require either Russian acceptance
of the changes or additional negotiations.
The Founding Fathers intended for the Senate to
serve as a quality control mechanism in treaty making.
Because of its flaws, New START will present
the Senate with a challenge to fulfill its constitutional
responsibilities. However, this difficulty should not
become an excuse for the Senate to shirk its responsibilities
and simply rubberstamp New START. As
with all major arms control treaties, if New START
enters into force, it could profoundly increase the
likelihood of nuclear war and increase the number
of weapons in the world. The very survival of the
United States may be at stake in these issues. The
American people are depending on their Senators
to take the necessary actions to defend them
against attack.
—Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow
in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. He
is also a member of the New START Working Group.
