By STEPHEN MOORE

Williston, N.D.

In his speech last week responding to high gas prices, President Barack Obama insisted that “we can’t just drill our way out of” our energy woes. Actually, we can—and if the president wants proof, he should travel to boomtown USA: Williston, North Dakota.

Williston sits atop the Bakken Shale, which will later this year be producing more oil than any other site in the country, surpassing even Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay, the longtime leader in domestic output. This once-sleepy town is what the Gold Rush might have looked like had it happened in the time of McDonald’s, Wal-Mart and Home Depot. And the oil rush is making Dakotans rich in a hurry, with farmers and other landowners becoming overnight millionaires from lucrative royalties and leases. One retired farmer tells me that, thanks to oil rigs churning on his property, he suddenly has a net worth north of $30 million.

Associated PressAn oil derrick outside Williston, N.D. (more…)

By STEPHEN MOORE

President Obama has frequently justified his policies—and judged their outcomes—in terms of equity, justice and fairness. That raises an obvious question: How does our existing system—and his own policy record—stack up according to those criteria?

Is it fair that the richest 1% of Americans pay nearly 40% of all federal income taxes, and the richest 10% pay two-thirds of the tax?

Is it fair that the richest 10% of Americans shoulder a higher share of their country’s income-tax burden than do the richest 10% in every other industrialized nation, including socialist Sweden?

Is it fair that American corporations pay the highest statutory corporate tax rate of all other industrialized nations but Japan, which cuts its rate on April 1?

Is it fair that President Obama sends his two daughters to elite private schools that are safer, better-run, and produce higher test scores than public schools in Washington, D.C.—but millions of other families across America are denied that free choice and forced to send their kids to rotten schools?

Is it fair that Americans who build a family business, hire workers, reinvest and save their money—paying a lifetime of federal, state and local taxes often climbing into the millions of dollars—must then pay an additional estate tax of 35% (and as much as 55% when the law changes next year) when they die, rather than passing that money onto their loved ones?

Associated Press (more…)

By CHARLES SCHWAB Mr. Schwab is founder and chairman of the Charles Schwab Corporation

We’re now in the 37th month of central government manipulation of the free-market system through the Federal Reserve’s near-zero interest rate policy. Is it working?

Business and consumer loan demand remains modest in part because there’s no hurry to borrow at today’s super-low rates when the Fed says rates will stay low for years to come. Why take the risk of borrowing today when low-cost money will be there tomorrow?

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told lawmakers last week that fiscal policy should first “do no harm.” The same can be said of monetary policy. The Fed’s prolonged, “emergency” near-zero interest rate policy is now harming our economy.

The Fed policy has resulted in a huge infusion of capital into the system, creating a massive rise in liquidity but negligible movement of that money. It is sitting there, in banks all across America, unused. The multiplier effect that normally comes with a boost in liquidity remains at rock bottom. Sufficient capital is in the system to spur growth—it simply isn’t being put to work fast enough.

Average American savers and investors in or near retirement are being forced by the Fed’s zero-rate policy to take greater investment risks. To get even modest interest or earnings on their savings, they move out of safer assets such as money markets, short-term bonds or CDs and into riskier assets such as stocks. Either that or they tie up their assets in longer-term bonds that will backfire on them if inflation returns. They’re also dramatically scaling back their consumer spending and living more modestly, thus taking money out of the economy that would otherwise support growth. (more…)

The two most powerful men in Washington have a big disagreement. No, not President Obama and Speaker John Boehner. We mean Mr. Obama and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, who can’t seem to agree on the health of the U.S. economy.

On Tuesday night, the President proclaimed that the “state of our Union is getting stronger,” employers are hiring faster than they can find skilled workers, and manufacturing is booming. Less than a day later, Mr. Bernanke and his Open Market Committee (FOMC) downgraded their already modest growth outlook and said the recovery is so vulnerable that the Fed must keep interest rates at near-zero for another three years.

The contradiction may not be as profound as it seems. Mr. Obama is running for re-election and this time he needs to sell audacity more than hope, while the Fed is still trying to reflate the housing market that it seems to believe is the main driver of economic growth. The Fed is straining to deliver the asset-price “stimulus” that Mr. Obama can’t any longer get out of Congress. (more…)

You know something’s wrong when a company like MetLife can’t find a buyer for its mortgage unit, fires 4,300 workers, and its stock rises. But such is the condition of America’s housing markets, where the risk of overregulation and litigation are so high that companies would rather abandon a business than take a risk on growing it.

MetLife is an illuminating example. Unlike Bank of America, which bought a shaky subprime lender in Countrywide and then had to take billions in losses when that market evaporated, MetLife got into the mortgage business in 2008 at the bottom of the market and snapped up a platform on the cheap. Its mortgage business soon spanned traditional loan origination, mortgage servicing and more.

Then came Dodd-Frank, the robo-signing pseudo-scandal, the state Attorneys General multibillion-dollar mortgage-servicing settlement talks, and the Obama Administration’s various efforts to halt foreclosures. Housing prices kept falling. In October, the Federal Reserve—which regulates MetLife’s banking subsidiary that backs its mortgage business—told the company it couldn’t return $4.8 billion to shareholders as dividends or stock buybacks until after a round of stress tests. MetLife sold the bank to GE Capital and wanted to sell its mortgage business too, citing an “uncertain marketplace and regulatory environment” despite its rising market share. (more…)

But the question is phrased badly. Three things happened: a housing bubble, a collapse in lending standards, and a global liquidity panic when markets lost trust in the solvency of financial institutions.

Now comes a Securities and Exchange Commission complaint against former Fannie and Freddie executives. The complaint makes plain that Fannie and Freddie held a lot more subprime loans than they publicly called subprime. It makes plain that Fannie and Freddie were co-sponsors with the private sector in driving down underwriting standards. Case in point: Fannie’s backing in 1999 of Countrywide’s “Fast and Easy” program to give buyers loans without proof of their income or assets.

So why do these SEC actions leave us queasy? The lawsuits don’t aim to do justice for the American people, but—very nominally—for Fannie and Freddie’s shareholders, who were supposedly misled by their disclosures. In fact, the complaints utterly miss the target in this regard.

Fannie and Freddie were under political pressure to underwrite loans to poor and minority borrowers. They were eager to do any business that appeared profitable. But investors knew what was going on. Investors’ biggest concern, as the duo’s losses mounted, was their political status. And right up to the moment it seized them, the Bush administration was insisting both were solvent and well capitalized.

Roll Call/Getty ImagesFormer CEOs of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in late 2008

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In his first response after news broke that he’d made $300,000 working for Freddie, Mr. Gingrich claimed he had “offered them advice on precisely what they didn’t do.” As a “historian,” he said during a November 9 debate, he had concluded last decade that “this is a bubble,” and that Freddie and its sister Fannie Mae should stop making loans to people who have no credit history. He added that now they should be broken up.

A week later Bloomberg reported that Mr. Gingrich had made between $1.6 million and $1.8 million in two separate contracts with Freddie between 1999 and 2008. The former Speaker stuck to his line that “I was approached to offer strategic advice” and had warned the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to stop lending to bad credit risks.

Getty ImagesRepublican Presidential Candidate Newt Gingrich

Then on December 2 our colleagues at the Journal reported that as late as April 2007 Mr. Gingrich had defended Fannie and Freddie as examples of conservative governance. “While we need to improve the regulation of the GSEs, I would be very cautious about fundamentally changing their role or the model itself,” Mr. Gingrich said in an interview at the time.

Mr. Gingrich added in that interview that there are times “when you need government to help spur private enterprise and economic development.” He cited electricity and telephone network expansion. “It’s not a point of view libertarians would embrace, but I am more in the Alexander Hamilton-Teddy Roosevelt tradition of conservatism,” he said, adding “I’m convinced that if NASA were a GSE, we probably would be on Mars today.” (more…)

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s lawsuits against six top executives of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, announced last week, are a seminal event.

For the first time in a government report, the complaint has made it clear that the two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) played a major role in creating the demand for low-quality mortgages before the 2008 financial crisis. More importantly, the SEC is saying that Fannie and Freddie—the largest buyers and securitizers of subprime and other low-quality mortgages—hid the size of their purchases from the market. Through these alleged acts of securities fraud, they did not just mislead investors; they deprived analysts, risk managers, rating agencies and even financial regulators of vital data about market risks that could have prevented the crisis.

The lawsuit necessarily focuses on 2006 and 2007, the years that are still within the statute of limitations. But according to the SEC complaint, the behavior went on for many years: “Since the 1990s, Freddie Mac internally categorized loans as subprime or subprime-like as part of its loan acquisition program,” while its senior officials continued to state publicly that it had little or no exposure to subprime loans. (more…)

A young risk analyst trained as a rocket scientist has just run numbers showing the firm has taken on much more risk investing in mortgages than its financial models had assumed was possible. His boss needs the numbers explained, saying, “I don’t even know what you do.” When the head of trading is shown the spreadsheet, he says, “I can’t read those things.” The fictional chief executive (“John Tuld,” a play on Dick Fuld of Lehman Brothers) asks the analyst to explain what he had discovered: “Speak to me in plain English, as you would to a young child or golden retriever.”

It wasn’t just senior executives at Wall Street firms who failed to understand the numbers and how bundling subprime mortgages would undermine value-at-risk measures. The same was true for the lawmakers and regulators who created the problem. Rep. Barney Frank, who last week announced his intention to retire from Congress, will be remembered for his comment in 2003: “I want to roll the dice a little bit more in this situation towards subsidized housing.” He got what he wanted: By 2008, half of the 54 million mortgages in the U.S. were subprime and other low-quality loans.

The instant spread of information in financial markets means that policy mistakes are reflected quickly, globally and sometimes signaling trillions of dollars in regulatory mistakes. But our system is so complex that it now takes actual rocket scientists to measure the risks.

Another example: The chief risk officer at MF Global spent a decade in aerospace and engineering before switching to Wall Street. Michael Roseman warned CEO Jon Corzine and the MF Global board about the risks of too much exposure to the bonds of European countries, to no avail. The firm went bankrupt as it became clear that sovereign debt was riskier than financial models assumed. Mr. Corzine, a Democratic former senator and governor of New Jersey, last week told a House committee: “I simply do not know where the money is.” (more…)