A ‘TRUE EUROPEAN ARMY’ DREAM ON !
A very realistic look at the possibility of a European Army. Europe’s dilemma is to continue the feeding of the socialistic beast (cradle to grave entitlements) or to increase its military so it can defend itself. I highlighted the author’s description of President Trump’s behavior towards the Europeans regarding their military spending (“his diplomacy of rudeness” and his “insolence”). Perhaps the Europeans would prefer that their dependency on the U.S. for military protection not be so rudely and openly discussed. Other presidents have complained (privately) and it got them nowhere with the Europeans. Everyone politely ignored the elephant in the room but not Trump ! He says it like it is !!! Nancy
Military autonomy is unworkable. There are better ways to improve the Continent’s defenses.
‘We must protect ourselves with respect to China, Russia, and even the United States,” French President Emmanuel Macron said earlier this month, calling for European strategic autonomy from the U.S. That autonomy would, in Mr. Macron’s words, include a “true European army.” A few days later, German chancellor Angela Merkel echoed the call for a European force. The vision is gaining momentum, propelled in part by Donald Trump’s diplomacy of rudeness against America’s European allies.
There’s one complication: European strategic autonomy, while it may be politically appealing, is military unrealistic. There are superior options for enhancing the Continent’s role in international security.
Mr. Macron wants Europe to become “a natural sovereign power.” Militarily, this would require at least three core capabilities, says German Lt. Gen. Heinrich Brauss, a longtime North Atlantic Treaty Organization official who retired this summer: “an independent European nuclear deterrent, the ability to ensure collective defense of Europe, and the ability to carry out military-crisis interventions anywhere in the world.” But Europe lacks the capacity to guarantee its own defense, and to act independently against major rivals.
For decades, Europe’s nuclear umbrella has been provided by the U.S. Even if France were prepared to extend its nuclear deterrent to other nations, no European ally would want to forgo U.S. protection. Europe’s militaries simply don’t have enough of the large weapons systems necessary to credibly deter Russia or China. “A large share of the military high-end capabilities and strategic enablers for NATO’s full mission spectrum is provided by the United States,” Gen. Brauss notes.
Replacing such American capabilities as well as manpower would force European governments to dramatically increase military spending from an average of less than 2% of GDP. In 2016 EU member states spent about €200 billion ($226 billion) on defense, compared with America’s $664 billion. And despite Mr. Trump’s insolence, U.S. spending on the European Deterrence Initiative—funding earmarked for European security, on top of the Pentagon’s regular budget—has increased from $789 million in 2016 to a requested $6.5 billion for next year.
Mr. Macron’s “European army” would require an integrated ground force, air force, and maritime force operating under a central command rather than under national governments. “For a true European army we’d need a European government, and currently that’s not in the realm of the possible,” says retired-Adm. Giampaolo di Paola, a former chief of defense and defense minister of Italy who also served as chairman of NATO’s military committee. The much more modest European Intervention Initiative, which Mr. Macron proposed in 2017, is already stalling. Germany suspects France is less interested in boosting European security than having allied troops relieve its forces in Africa.
But Mr. Macron is right that European defense is too fragmented, and there are realistic ways to address that problem. Some are already under way. Sweden and Finland have been integrating select air force and naval units since 2013. Sweden, Norway and Finland’s air forces conduct joint exercises nearly every week and use one another’s air bases. Belgium and the Netherlands maintain a shared naval fleet, and the Baltic states are considering building a combined navy. Together, France and Germany maintain a longstanding brigade. Parts of the Dutch Army are integrated into the German Army, and similar efforts are under way with German and Polish forces. Such pooling improves efficiency.
“It’s very useful that the commander of the Dutch army has completed both the Dutch and the German general staff officer training,” says Gen. Bruno Kasdorf, a former commander of the German army. “Real European defense integration is only possible if future top commanders are well versed in other armed forces’ distinct aspects.”
Peanuts? Perhaps. But incremental improvements are far more workable than visions of strategic autonomy. Adm. Di Paola argues that more bilateral integration is possible, with France, Germany, Italy or the U.K. as the senior partner.
Europeans must also strengthen their long-term security partnership with the U.S. Gen. Brauss notes that European allies should fulfill their commitments to enhancing the size, quality and readiness of their forces. “Improved capabilities, along with more investment and more cooperation, would strengthen both NATO and Europe’s ability to act,” he says. “It would also improve trans-Atlantic burden-sharing.” Mr. Trump would have considerably less fodder for angry tweets.
The danger of loose talk about strategic autonomy is that it becomes a botched self-fulfilling prophecy. The U.S. might take Europe at its word and disengage. Unless European politicians are willing to ask their voters to fund troops and weapons currently provided by the U.S., they should stop daydreaming about going solo.
Ms. Braw directs the Modern Deterrence project at the U.K.’s Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.
